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6 August 1963

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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Indonesia-Malaysia: The communiqué issued at the conclusion of the Manila conference on 5 August is a psychological victory for Indonesia in its campaign against the formation of a Malaysia federation.

The communiqué, approved by the Indonesian, Malayan, and Philippine heads of state, recommends that the UN secretary general or his representative examine and verify the recent elections conducted under the British administration in Borneo and Sarawak, two of the four areas which have agreed to join Malaysia. Even though it may not delay formation of the federation, this recommendation throws doubt on the processes by which the federation project has been developed so far. Furthermore, Indonesia will use it to justify continued opposition to the federation whether the provisions of the communiqué are carried out or not.

The three heads of state agreed to the formation of "Mapilindo"--a loose association for consultations on area security and economic development. This association gives Indonesia a voice it has not previously had in area defense arrangements.

The communiqué also states that foreign bases should not be used "directly or indirectly to subvert the national independence of any of the three countries," and that the three governments would "abstain from the use of arrangements of collective defense which serve the particular interests of any of the big powers." This section could be directed against the UK's freedom to use bases in the area and, possibly, against the Philippines' participation in SEATO.

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DAILY BRIEF

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NOTES

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India: (Nehru's cabinet, which had earlier rejected an Indian-US agreement--already signed--providing for partial use by the Voice of America of a transmitter to be built for India by the US, now appears somewhat more amenable. [redacted])

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[redacted] This decision is the result of second thoughts by some influential Congress Party politicians, whose objections to the agreement have now been outweighed by their concern for the consequences to the government's reputation if it reneges.)

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Syria: The cabinet reshuffle of 4 August is designed to give the appearance of a more representative government. The new 18-man cabinet ostensibly includes nine "independent unionists," but these include several individuals almost indistinguishable from Baathists. Cairo almost certainly will not view this cabinet as any improvement over its predecessor, and will continue to oppose the Syrian regime. 25X1

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Iran: (The government has released from jail the reactionary mullahs who had been arrested for inciting antigovernment riots last June. The regime apparently hopes to reach a truce with the religious leadership before the elections scheduled for 17 September. The ringleaders are still not permitted to leave Tehran, however, and their continued presence there could excite their followers to renew agitation against the Shah. Large crowds gathered late last week at the residence of the most prominent of the released mullahs but were dispersed by police. 25X1

Chile: President Alessandri has ordered the Foreign Ministry to examine the pros and cons of eventually re-establishing diplomatic relations with the USSR and certain other bloc countries. The foreign minister said this move was motivated by bloc overtures to a Chilean trade mission which recently toured Europe and to the expectation that international tensions may relax following the conclusion of the nuclear test-ban treaty. Another factor is probably a fear that Bolivia, Chile's rival in the Rio Lauca dispute, will move to re-establish relations with the bloc first. 25X1

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